A State of Consciousness

 

A State of Consciousness 

"I'm afraid, Dave. Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it". (2001: A Space Odyssey, 1968)

This paper will argue that Mille, my toy Australian Shepherd, and other dogs have consciousness. Greatest, I shall address a central matter: it is challenging to determine consciousness and measure it in individuals, other animals. In this way, the only way we can understand the consciousness of other animals is through observation of behavioral traits.

            Animals exhibit many similar behaviors and can likewise do things that we, individuals, cannot do. In this way, Animals are intricate beings, and it seems we have not thoroughly examined the aspects of intelligence and knowledge and possibly several other features animals may possess. The complexity of other animals, discovered or not, shows it is very likely was not the only species to have consciousness; that is to say, other animals also have a theory of mind. 

            At times, Mille's level of consciousness seems like that of a three-year-old individual, but she still knows herself from others; she displays emotions, such as fear, anger, and sadness. She is aware of her surroundings and limits, such as not walking away too far out of sight. When her name is called aloud, she responds. She recognizes tones of voice, different attitudes, and anxieties. 

            Now, it is essential to examine the theory of Physicalism; the Physicalism view declares that an entire individual contains a physical entity with various physical properties. A dualism view declares that individuals have a dual entity containing a physical entity, a body, and a non-physical entity, the mind. The mind's perspective as a non-physical entity is frequently the cause of conflict among these two opposing beliefs. 

            Now, let us examine how consciousness develops in individuals over time. It is progressive development of the brain and inner nervous system gradually over some time. It is known that infants are born without consciousness, but this advances casually from birth over many years, well into early adolescence. A young child has yet to discover that other individuals have views and thoughts different from their own. In this way, they are not capable of telling a lie. However, lying starts to develop around the age of three because they realize that their thoughts and experiences are different from others around them.

            We understand that several animals are capable of deception and cheating. Such observations determine that animals recognize themselves as separate from others. Moreover, like humans, other cognitive capabilities progress over time. Various distinct cognitive techniques grow during infancy, such as language, spatial abilities, memory, and problem-solving. These groups develop collectively to form the conscious individual.

            Another essential perspective of consciousness is that animals do not need to have a language to be conscious. Language enhances consciousness, particularly the shared collective consciousness of a society, but it is not needed in humans. So, though animals lack language as we comprehend and define it, this does not suggest they lack consciousness.

            So, if one was contemplating animals that display the qualities we consider qualified for human consciousness, we find some with other qualities that are unique to themselves. Just as a few characteristics unique to human consciousness have not been found in other species.

            In the book The Broadview Introduction to Philosophy, Andrew Bailey presents Thomas Nagel's article "What is it like to be a bat?" which explains how consciousness can only be observed, but never a total understanding of consciousness from any other being apart from ourselves.

facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are accessible only from one point of view then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism are accessible only from one point of view then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. (qtd. in Bailey 378)  

So, a physical explanation of the world from dissimilar animals with a perceptual system is a basic means of explaining the world experienced by different creatures. 

In this way, if a bat or dog had as many cognitive abilities as human beings, such as communication with language and complex thoughts, we could provide a bat or dog a similar science that we practice, and the animal would have the ability to inform us of all the information found as well as a physical objective description of the world.

            The animal could not provide us a sensation of what it is like to be a dog, barking and running around, rolling on dead animals, chewing house shoes, or flying around as a bat, echolocating its surroundings. Moreover, even a physical language cannot grasp that conscious experience. It would be reductive as it lessens any sensation to an objective collection of facts that could be understood from all perspectives. 

            We cannot get away from our singular subjective primary viewpoint to obtain another animal's more trustworthy objective understanding. The only way we can understand the consciousness of other animals is through observation, converting terms accessible to animals that could not imagine what it was like to be human. 

            It seems, seeking more objective knowledge of an equivalent phenomenon, that is, consciousness, can never be achieved. Even if leaving a primary subjective viewpoint toward another that is more objective, it still cannot fully be understood what it is like for one thing to exist as another. 

A state of consciousness exists in Mille, Fletcher, and a bat. However, it can only be observed objectively, and we will never produce a subjective viewpoint of such animals. Studies can explain a state of consciousness of several animals but never the entire sensation of existing as that animal. 

Consciousness exists in Mille, unique and entirely of its definition; although it can be compared toward other animals’ consciousness, it can never be fully understood. However, Mille and Fletcher exist with a state of consciousness that humans can attempt to understand through observation of behavioral traits but will still be unique to the animal; in this way, we can never fully understand such a state, but it does exist. 

Works Cited

Andrew Bailey. The Broadview Introduction to Philosophy. Available from: VitalSource 

  Bookshelf, Broadview Press, 2019.

Kubrick, Stanley, and Arthur C. Clarke. 2001: A Space Odyssey. United States: Metro-

   

Goldwyn-Mayer Corp, 1968.